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Informal Home Care and Labor Force 
Participation of Household Members
Abstract
In Germany, informal home care is preferred to professional care services in the 
public discussion as well as in legal care regulations. However, they ascribe only 
minor importance to the opportunity costs care givers have to face. Therefore, this 
paper explores the inﬂ  uence home care has on the labor supply of carers who live 
together with their care recipient. I am using the German Socio-Economic Panel of 
the years 2001 to 2007 which allows the characteristics of both groups to be merged. 
Furthermore, I look at female and male care givers separately. The results show that 
having an individual in need of care in the household does not decrease labor supply 
to an economically relevant extent. As caring and the labor supply decision might 
be endogenous, I test for endogeneity by using characteristics of care recipients as 
instruments and I look at sample attrition. In addition, the panel structure allows to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, which is probably strong for care.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: J14, J22, D64
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The ﬁnancing of the German pay-as-you-go system in the mandatory pension and
health insurance has been a major political concern in recent years due to the de-
mographic change. Nowadays, the mandatory public care insurance has joined this
discussion under ﬁnancial and social aspects. The absolute as well as the relative num-
ber of elderly individuals has been increasing rapidly whereas the number of the oldest
old is rising even faster (Gilberg, 2000). While some researchers state that morbidity is
decreasing through technical progress in medicine (theory of compression on morbid-
ity), others expect that the increasing life expectancy of the elderly increases the need
for care as people suﬀer from severe illnesses like Alzheimer’s and other senile dementia
illnesses when they reach old age (Gilberg, 2000). The rising demand for care would,
therefore, increase costs for formal and institutional care on the care market. In 1999,
the expenses of the public care insurance were larger than the yearly contributions for
the ﬁrst time since the social care insurance had been introduced in 1995 (Deutsch-
land in Zahlen 2007). A recent forecast by Schnabel (2007) until the year of 2050 on
behalf of the Federal Ministry for Family Aﬀairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth
(BMFSFJ) has calculated that the contributions to the public care insurance have to
rise from 1.7 % - 1.95 % to 3 % - 5.5 %, depending on the demographic scenario, to
ﬁnance future expenses. The forecasts are based on constant care probabilities from
the year 2005 and Schnabel (2007) predicts that the number of care recipients will
increase up to 4.7 million individuals until 2050. As the compulsory care insurance is
organized according to the German pay-as-you-go system as well, working individuals
are charged with rising contributions, which then decreases their net wage. As these
relations have already been known when the public care insurance was introduced, the
law emphasizes the importance of care within social networks such as families: Infor-
mal home care is given precedence to formal home care and formal home care is given
precedence to institutional care (SGB XI § 3, Rothgang (1997)). The ﬁnancial relief
of the social care insurance as well as the ﬁnancial relief of the government’s budget
are one of the main reasons for this arrangement. The idea is that informal care is less
4expensive and might be more eﬀective than formal care.
In addition, the social aspect of care has been emphasized recently. The dignity
and quality of life of the elderly is expected to be higher when they can stay in their
usual environment and are attended to by their own family and friends (Heitmueller
and Inglis, 2004).1 However, this argument often forgets to take the opportunity costs
of carers into account. Not only psychological, physical, and social costs have to be
kept in mind. Forgone earnings, decreasing productivity, and absenteeism from the
workplace are some of the problems working caregivers have to face (Fast et al., 1999).
Some might even have to leave the labor market to provide the amount of care needed
by an impaired individual. Figure 1 illustrates the labor force participation of men and
women by age in the bar graph and, at the same time, the percentage of caregivers
over the same age distribution in the line graph among Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
respondents. Obviously, the double time burden of work and care increases after the
age of 45 and further rises until retirement.
Figure 1: The occupation with paid employment and home care by age
1Another demographic aspect is that the amount of potential carers is decreasing as well: Smaller
family sizes through decreasing fertility, new household/family types (e.g. through divorces), increased
mobility and a change in social norms, like responsibility and individualism, are some of the reasons
for this development.
5Economically speaking, two counteracting eﬀects are determining labor supply. As
time becomes scarce when looking after a disabled individual, the shadow wage rate
of the carer increases and labor supply is reduced. This is the substitution eﬀect. On
the other hand, the opportunity costs of the carer are usually not fully reimbursed by
the care recipient, which is an incentive to keep working. This is the income eﬀect.
If the ﬁrst eﬀect outweighs the second one, labor force participation will be reduced.
The public care insurance is likely to cover only some of the arising expenses when an
individual is ranked into one of the German care levels.2 However, the opportunity costs
and the costs for formal and institutional care are usually too high to be completely
covered by this care allowance. Therefore, the decision about the type of care that is
utilized must also consider what the care recipient and his family can aﬀord.
Support to impaired individuals in Germany has only been examined by a few
studies so far. Therefore, this paper focuses on the inﬂuence of informal home care
on the labor force participation of carers in Germany who live in the same household
as the care recipient. However, I do not only look at elderly care recipients, but also
I do consider all age groups as the inﬂuence of care on work occurs regardless of the
age of the care recipient. Parents are likely to be the carer for young children. Adults
are also the most likely carers for their impaired spouse or partner. Old or oldest
old care recipients are either also cared for by a spouse or partner if they are still
alive and in relatively good health or by their own children who are middle-aged at
that time. In the empirical analyses, I test for endogeneity bias and panel attrition.
Panel estimation methods allow to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The results
illustrate that caregiving does not inﬂuence the probability of employment. Working
hours are reduced by 28 minutes for women and by 35 minutes for men, though.
2See Federal Ministry of Health (ed.) (2008) for an overview of the most important services of the
German public care insurance.
62 Literature review
Most of the early literature on caregiving comes from the U.S. in the 1980s and 90s
and calculates bivariate correlations. Overall, the results indicate a reduction in work
hours (Muurinen, 1986) but not in the probability of employment (Stone and Short,
1990). In addition, working women provide signiﬁcantly fewer care hours (Brody and
Schoonover, 1986; Soldo and Hill, 1995; Boaz, 1996). Moen et al. (1994), however,
receive no eﬀect when looking at diﬀerent cohorts of women.
Multivariate studies can conﬁrm these results although they depend on diﬀerent
samples, data, and estimation techniques. While Wolf and Soldo (1994) ﬁnd no eﬀect
of care on work, Ettner (1995, 1996) and Stern (1995) support earlier bivariate ﬁndings
when they use instruments in their analyses. Other studies in this respect conﬁrm a
modest reduction in work hours and employment probability (Doty et al., 1998; Pezzin
and Schone, 1999).
The ﬁrst panel analysis with data from the 1980s has been undertaken by Arber
and Ginn (1995) and Pavalko and Artis (1997). While the ﬁrst study states that
care is not decreasing the probability of employment but the overall time burden of
women in particular, the latter provides correlations rather than estimation results as
an examination of the endogeneity problem was neglected. This is also true for the
ﬁrst European wide study by Spiess and Schneider (2002). A recent publication by
Bolin et al. (2008) with SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe)
data conﬁrms negative labor supply eﬀects. They state that men in Northern and
Southern Europe encounter stronger eﬀects than those in Southern Europe. The latest
study from the U.S. has been undertaken by Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) who use
panel data of the HRS (Health and Retirement Study) from 1994 to 1996. In addition
to their ﬁnding that caregiving has an economically large and negative eﬀect on work
hours of men and women, they also come to the conclusion that formal care purchased
within the market is not an attractive substitute for family care. As far as Great
Britain is concerned, Carmichael and Charles (1998, 2003a), Carmichael and Charles
(2003b) ﬁnd that informal carers of both sexes who care for less than 20 hours per week
7are more likely to participate in the labor market but work fewer hours than similar
non-carers for GHS (General Household Survey) data. However, informal carers who
care for more than 20 hours per week are less likely to be employed. These results are
conﬁrmed by Heitmueller and Inglis (2004) with the BHPS (British Household Panel
Survey). In the same year Heitmueller (2007) published a study which takes a close
look at the problem of endogeneity concerning caregiving and employment. On the
one hand, he only ﬁnds a signiﬁcant impact of caregiving on labor force participation
for co-residence and concludes that the carer has less of a choice in caring under these
circumstances. On the other hand, he argues that missing employment opportunities
might abet caregiving when the disabled elderly does not live in the same house or
when the needed number of care hours are only small. However, he does not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant eﬀect in this respect.
Empirical evidence for Germany in particular is very scarce. The study of Schneek-
loth and Engels (2006) only provides descriptive statistics about care arrangements and
their usage and tries to determine the characteristics of carers. Moreover, other de-
scriptive studies from the SOEP present that having a daughter leads to a signiﬁcantly
greater use of formal and informal care (Himes et al., 2001) and that men provide 2.5
hours of care on a usual week day while women only perform a little more, namely
3 hours (Schupp and K¨ unemund, 2004). They also illustrate that most people prefer
providing and receiving care within the family. Michaelis et al. (2005) look at the usage
of care arrangements before and after the introduction of the care insurance in Ger-
many in 1995. They ﬁnd that the importance of types of informal care decreases while
types of formal care are used more intensively. The only econometric analysis based on
the SOEP was published by Schneider et al. (2001). Using event history analysis, they
examine how middle-aged married women change employment status due to caregiving
responsibilities in the 1980s and early 90s. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly higher propensity
to leave the labor force but can not indicate a higher probability to change to part time
work to accommodate the caregiving burden. Although they are using data from 1984
for West Germany, and from 1991 for East Germany, to 1996, they do not take changes
due to the introduction of the care insurance in 1995 into account. A negative eﬀect
8for Germany is also conﬁrmed with eight waves of the ECHP (European Community
Household Panel) by Viitanen (2005) who estimates a negative eﬀect of caregiving on
the employment probability for Germany.
Compared to the existing literature, this paper focuses on German SOEP data from
2001 to 2007 and, therefore, to the current care policy regime3 By using these years,
I am also able to overcome some data limitations of past studies. Most of the studies
cited above suﬀer from diﬀerent data limitations. Problems arise when the survey only
contains answers of the care recipient or the carer because the relationship between
care and employment should consider all characteristics of individuals, which are in-
volved in bargaining over informal caregiving. The NLTCS (National Long Term Care
Study) tries to solve this by asking the care recipient to name a care giver who is then
interviewed as well (Pezzin and Schone, 1999). In most cases, empirical results cannot
check for selectivity bias as there are only care recipients and their carers in the data
set. Therefore, the decision of caregiving cannot be observed (Boaz, 1996; Johnson
and Lo Sasso, 2000) and the estimated coeﬃcients might be biased. In addition, the
variables that are necessary for the analyses may suﬀer from vague questions in the
survey or do not include questions concerning the intensity of care (Wolf and Soldo,
1994). The two British data sets only distinguish between a few categories of care in-
tensity (Heitmueller, 2007; Carmichael and Charles, 2003a,b). In addition, the diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of care and caregivers are one important reason for the variance of research
results and prevalence rates in the above cited studies. Variables on the carer’s or care
recipient’s income or on their human capital investment are also often incomplete or
missing although they are important determinants of labor supply (Johnson and Lo
Sasso, 2000). Another problem is the small number of observations in some of the data
sets (Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Stone and Short, 1990; Moen et al., 1994).
However, since 2001, the capture of care data has become more reasonable in Ger-
many as well. Additional variables like the number of hours an individual cares for
somebody else help to identify a caregiver in the SOEP. The so called care level, a
3The Pﬂege-Weiterentwicklungsgesetz from the 1st of July 2008 does not change the implications
of this system substantially (Federal Law Gazette (ed.) 2008).
9measure of the degree of disability, has been captured since 2001 as well.4 Activities of
Daily Living (e.g. dressing, shaving, washing) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Liv-
ing (e.g. errands outside the house, preparing meals) are also asked for to identify the
needs of the impaired individual living in the household. The preparation of relevant
data within the SOEP is, however, still a problem. Only care recipients living within
a SOEP household can be taken into account and some programming is necessary to
merge the information of carer and care recipient. Respondents who care for someone
who is not living in the same SOEP household cannot be examined, though.
The analysis uses panel data and, therefore, checks for unobserved heterogeneity
which is likely to be substantial in caregiving decisions. In addition, the endogenous
relation between employment and care is taken into account. I also test for panel
attrition.
3 Theoretical approach
3.1 Diﬀerent reasons for caregiving
The literature diﬀerentiates between three approaches to model care given to a disabled
individual. These are the altruistic model according to Becker (1974), the strategic
bequest motive formulation from Bernheim et al. (1985), and the family bargaining
approach formulated by Pezzin and Schone (1999).
The social interaction model formulated by Becker (1974) leads to the result that
the household head’s utility function is suﬃcient to describe the preferences of all fam-
ily members. As his maximization behavior takes all relevant changes in commodity
prices and family members’ incomes into account, the family’s common utility function
4Care level 0: Minor help, no care allowance from care insurance.
Care level I: Help in two ADL once a day for at least 90 minutes, help needed in IADL several times
a week.
Care level II: Help in ADL three times a day for at least three hours, help needed in IADL several
times a week.
Care level III: Help round-the-clock, help needed in IADL several times a week.
10is solely represented by that of the head of household. I am convinced that this frame-
work, contrary to the other two approaches, is the most appropriate one to describe
caregiving within a household for the following reasons:
The decision to live together is the ﬁrst indicator of altruism when the care recipient
is not a spouse of the carer. If a person within a household is in need of care, other
household members will certainly have to react to this person’s needs (Pezzin and
Schone, 1999; Ettner, 1995) even if a future bequest might not be high enough to
compensate for foregone earnings and costs of care. Together with Becker’s theory of
the division of labor in families (Becker, 1991) it is, therefore, reasonable to assume
that the household maximizes a common utility function. Another argument for this
assumption is provided by data collected by Schneekloth and Engels (2006) which
shows that the preferences of moving into a nursing home are quite similar between
the carer and care giver’s generation. In 2006, more than 80 % of SOEP respondents
would either turn to the spouse/partner, mother or daughter for help in the case of
long-term care needs. Reasons for this might be social norms or a feeling of general
reciprocity. The probability of moving into a nursing home then depends on the burden
the carer has to bear if the health status of the care recipient deteriorates. This will
become more likely if the impaired becomes cognitively unaware. I, therefore, assume
that the family bargaining process has already taken place in the past and that the
employment decision depends on the health status of the disabled person and hence,
care is provided according to their needs.5 This probability is even increased when the
person in need is a spouse, partner, or the carer’s disabled child.
The family budget constraint in Becker’s model has been criticized by Altonji et al.
(1992, 1997) and Hayashi (1995). However, the ﬁndings of the aforementioned authors
do not contradict altruism if one extends its notion to aﬀection. In addition, the
greatest part of the care recipient’s income consists of various government transfers and
does, therefore, not necessarily inﬂuence the carer’s time allocation decision between
work time, care time and leisure. An argument conﬁrming this point of view for
5Bargaining can of course continue over the mixture of informal and formal care. This question is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
11Germany is the so called “Hilfe zur Pﬂege” after SGB §§ 61 et sqq in combination
with the principle of subsidiarity in SGB XII § 2 which makes family members of
handicapped individuals liable to recourse. As I assume here that caregiving is not
explicitly paid for within the household6 and by keeping in mind that formal care is
expensive and may exceed the disabled person’s assets when they are impaired for quite
a long time, this argument is justiﬁed (Schneider et al., 2001). Therefore, the caregiver
will take the income of all other household members into account when making his
labor supply decision. However, the income of the care recipient is only considered in
paying for all costs that occur through their needs.
3.2 Theoretical expectations
A neoclassical time allocation model with rational utility-maximizing individuals who
are altruistic is used to derive comparative statics. In the context of this paper, the
groups in Becker’s social interaction model consist of two members of the same house-
hold. One of its members is an altruistic ”head” in the sense of providing care hours
to another household member who is disabled. The carer’s utility function is then suf-
ﬁcient to determine the optimal level of time allocation (Becker, 1974). All decisions
in this model are, therefore, taken by the carer alone. The care recipient is passive in
this process. The carer allocates his time between paid employment, caregiving, and
leisure to maximize his utility which is subject to a budget and a time constraint. The
utility function reads as
U = u(cc)+v(T − hw − hc)+x(y,hc,h 0,g,c c,c r) (1)
where u, v, x and are concave functions with strictly positive ﬁrst partial derivatives
and negative second partial derivatives. Following Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000), u is
the utility derived from consumption for the carer cc, v is the level of utility received
from leisure where T is the total amount of time available to the carer and hw and hc
are the number of hours which are spent in paid employment or for care, respectively.
6A question concerning the payment of informal carers is only included in the SOEP since 2004.
12x is the utility which the carer receives from the well-being of his care recipient. It
increases with the disabled person’s health y , informal care hc and formal care h0, the
amount of care allowance g, and the consumption of himself cr and his carer cc.I ti s
assumed that the utility function is separable in its three components which implies
that leisure is a normal commodity and, therefore, rising if income rises.
The maximization of function (1) is subject to the budget constraint in (2) and the
time constraint in (3)
c ≤ whw + A (2)
T ≥ hw + hc (3)
where w is the wage rate earned in the carer’s job and I is other household income
which comprises net labor income from other household members as well as the house-
hold’s non-labor income but not labor income of the individual under consideration.
I assume further that all resources for consumption are utilized which makes (2) a
binding constraint. However, (3) is not binding, hence, deﬁning a positive amount of
leisure.7
The carer allocates his time in a way that the marginal utility of consumption
times the wage rate u w equals the marginal utility of leisure v  as well as the marginal
utility of caregiving x . Due to the assumptions made above, an eﬀect that increases
the marginal utility of labor increases the time spent in paid employment and decreases
the amount of both, care and leisure. Shocks in exogenous variables will, therefore,
change the allocation of time for all activities to restore the equilibrium.8
Comparative statics show: if the household’s income rises, the number of hours
worked decreases while caregiving intensiﬁes to maintain the equilibrium. In addition,
the decrease in hours of work exceeds the rise in the amount of caregiving and time
devoted to leisure rises as well. All other exogenous eﬀects show an ambiguous eﬀect
7As the reaction of amount of work and amount of caregiving on exogenous shocks is tested here,
I assume that at least some work and care is done which makes a case study for comparative statics
superﬂuous.
8The comparative static results can be found in the Appendix.
13in the comparative statics equations: If, on the one hand, caregiving and the disabled
person’s health are substitutes the hours devoted to paid employment will increase
with the care recipient’s health. On the other hand, the eﬀect remains undetermined
if caregiving and health are complements. Therefore, additional hours of care are
more eﬀective when the disabled person is in better health. It seems reasonable to
assume that carers will spend less time caring if there are other sources of help available
to take over some of the caregiving tasks and, therefore, they would be substitutes.
However, both types of care could well be complements when the health status of
the disabled individual becomes worse. The amount of care allowance that the care
recipient receives from the mandatory public care insurance rises with the classiﬁcation
in care levels which is equal to an increase in the disability of the care recipient. It
might be plausible to assume that the hours devoted to paid employment will increase
more if formal care can be purchased in the market. However, it can well be the case
that the disabled person even has to be institutionalized due to his worse health status.
Thus, Social Security care transfers and caregiving would be substitutes in this case.
However, if caregiving and the amount of care allowance received by the care recipient
are complements, the carer might be forced to spend more time caring and even less
working as the disabled individual remains in the household but is in need of intensiﬁed
care. I do not discuss the eﬀect of a c.p. higher care recipient’s income on time transfer
as I cannot reliably identify it. I, however, believe that it is more plausible to assume
that more formal care can be purchased in the market to disburden the care giver who
would then increase his time spent on paid employment than to assume a strategic
bequest motive mechanism.
In general, four diﬀerent scenarios are identiﬁed by Schneider et al. (2001) that de-
scribe how labor force participation can react to the start or the increase of caregiving
tasks: First of all, the reorganization of household production might be suﬃcient to
cope with caregiving. This means that time intensive leisure activities are reduced ﬁrst
and that no inﬂuence of caregiving on paid employment can be detected. Secondly,
if the opportunity costs of care are low for a single person within the household, care
increases the value of household production. This scenario is more likely when the
14household has a high income in general so that the salary of the carer is not needed
to maintain the standard of living of the household as a whole. Thirdly, if the oppor-
tunity costs of formal care are higher than the potential carer’s loss in earnings, the
employment spell is terminated or the hours of work are reduced. As a last remark,
Schneider et al. (2001) refer to SGB XI §§ 1 and 37. These paragraphs rule that the
responsible care insurance fund pays the pension contributions for a carer who does
not work for more than thirty hours per week in the labor market. Therefore, this
transfer increases the non-working income of the carer and leaving the labor market
might be a favorable option for those who have reached ages near the retirement age
or are working for a few hours only. Although I cannot diﬀerentiate between these
scenarios with the variables in my data set, they provide useful explanations for the
reasons why some individuals leave the labor force while others will not quit their jobs.
4 Data set and descriptive statistics
This paper uses SOEP data which is a representative longitudinal micro-data set cov-
ering a wide range of socioeconomic information on randomly selected households in
Germany. The ﬁrst round of data was collected from approximately 6,000 families in
former West Germany in 1984. After German re-uniﬁcation in 1989, the SOEP was ex-
tended by about 2,200 families from East Germany. In 2007, about 22,000 individuals
in 11,000 households participated in the data set.
In contrast to Schneider et al. (2001), I am employing the waves from the years 2001
to 2007 to take advantage of the newly included variables on caregiving. Moreover, I
am able to connect the characteristics of the co-residing carer and care recipient. All
respondents who care for someone who lives outside their own household, have to be
dropped from the sample (3,263 observations / 5.26 %) because I have no information
on their care recipient’s characteristics. In addition, the sample contains rich data
on employment status, income, education, and other individual characteristics. The
sample contains about 58,777 observations consisting of 14,119 individuals9 living in
9Self-employed individuals are not included into the data set as the quality of responses on income
159,374 households. I will look at women and men separately as their labor supply
and care behavior is diﬀerent which can already be seen in Table 1 and 2. Schupp
and K¨ unemund (2004) say that men are occupied with care to an extent that almost
equals that of women. Nevertheless, care hours are still 20 % less for men than women
in the SOEP. Other studies conﬁrm that men take over responsibility in caregiving
(Carmichael and Charles, 2003b). However, Dwyer and Coward (1991) show that men
usually provide help in instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) which are easier
to arrange around the work schedule while women are helping with activities of daily
living (ADLs) which are ranked to be more time consuming. In this data set, 30,290
women and 28,487 men between 36 and 64 years are included as the frequency of
caregiving in this sample clearly increases after reaching the age of 35 (Figure 1).
4.1 The characteristics of potential carers
Tables 1 and 2 provide a detailed distribution of characteristics of women and men
by labor force participation and time assistance in care across the years 2001 to 2007.
Table 6 in the Appendix presents the pooled means and standard deviations.
Overall, 62.44 % of women and 76.99 % of men are in paid employment. 2.33 %
of women and 1.58 % of men state that they give some time assistance to a disabled
individual while the mean care hours are 33.86 and 21.62, respectively. Among female
caregivers, 48.15 % are still working while 51.48 % are not employed. This diﬀerence
is somewhat larger for male caregivers: 56.92 % are in paid employment while 43.78 %
are not working.
Compared to the whole sex-speciﬁc samples, carers tend to be older. The diﬀerence
between men and women mainly results from the earlier retirement age of women.10
However, it is not possible to tell whether the termination of work spells at these ages is
related to caregiving. The marital status variables have the expected results. Among
those who are without a partner, men are more likely to provide care compared to
is less reliable.
10The actual retirement age of men is 60.90 in West Germany and 59.70 in East Germany, the one
for women is 61.40 in the West and 58.90 in the East of Germany (Deutschland in Zahlen 2007).
16Table 1: Labor force participation and care provision of women
Women All Workers Care givers
All Workers Non-workers
All 100 62.44 2.33 48.15 51.84
Care hoursa 0.79 0.5 33.86 27.84 39.46
Age
Ages 36 – 55 75.06 66.15 36.26 85.88 47.81
Ages 56 - 65 24.94 13.45 33.85 14.12 52.19
Marital status
Married 74.05 71.8 86.26 85.59 86.89
Divorced 14.83 16.76 5.52 6.47 4.64
Single 6.65 8.15 5.95 6.76 5.19
Widowed 4.47 3.29 2.27 1.18 3.28
Household sizea 2.89 2.91 3.37 3.52 3.23
Household income (¤/month)◦ 2,809 3,040 3,020 3,433 2,637
Number of children
Younger than 7 8.45 6.68 5.24 5 5.46
Ages 7 -16 31.82 34.25 26.35 31.76 21.31
Years of education◦ 11.78 12.14 11.5 11.91 11.12
Health status
Very good 5.9 6.77 3.12 3.82 2.46
Good - Satisfying 76.75 80.04 74.64 80.59 69.12
Poor 14.42 11.5 17.14 14.41 19.67
Very poor 2.92 1.39 5.1 1.18 8.74
Characteristics of care recipients
Age
A g e s1-5 5 0.95 0.86 36.26 42.94 30.05
Ages 56 – 79 0.67 0.47 26.35 22.65 29.78
Ages 80 and older 2.35 1.84 16.43 15 17.76
Needs help with ...
... errands out of the house 2.35 1.84 91.5 92.06 90.98
... household chores and preparing meals 2.16 1.88 86.12 85.88 86.34
... minor tasks of daily help 1.87 1.36 75.78 70.88 80.33
... major tasks of daily help 0.91 0.61 37.11 31.76 42.08
Care level - Zero: Person in need of help 0.83 0.73 29.46 34.12 25.14
Care level - One 0.86 0.64 34.99 33.82 36.07
Care level - Two 0.57 0.45 22.95 23.53 22.4
Care level - Three 0.31 0.16 12.61 8.53 16.39
Other sources of help 0.33 0.31 12.18 15.59 9.02
Observations 30,290 18,916 706 340 366
Source: GSOEP subsample of men of the waves 2001 to 2007 (unweighted).
aThese values are mean values for the respective samples, not percentages.
17Table 2: Labor force participation and care provision of men
Men All Workers Care givers
All Workers Non-workers
All 100 76.99 1.58 56.22 43.78
Care hoursa 0.34 0.18 21.62 15.29 29.75
Age
Ages 36 – 55 74.25 83.96 59.56 78.66 35.03
Ages 56 - 65 25.75 16.04 40.44 21.34 64.97
Marital status
Married 76.31 77.64 80.67 77.87 84.26
Divorced 12.15 11.19 7.56 10.28 4.06
Single 10.27 10.39 9.78 10.28 9.14
Widowed 1.27 0.78 2 1.58 2.54
Household sizea 2.94 3.07 3.2 3.48 2.85
Household income (¤/month)◦ 2,879 3,137 2,812 3,225 2,281
Number of children
Younger than 7 11.25 13.19 4 5.14 2.54
Ages 7 -16 32 36.85 26.44 40.32 8.63
Years of education◦ 12.12 12.4 11.41 11.82 10.88
Health status
Very good 5.96 6.83 5.33 7.51 2.54
Good - Satisfying 77.72 82.01 72.23 76.68 66.5
Poor 13.24 9.87 16.89 13.04 21.83
Very poor 3.08 1.3 5.56 2.77 9.14
Characteristics of care recipient
Age
A g e s0-5 5 1.07 1.02 42 50.59 30.96
Ages 56 – 79 0.52 0.27 24.89 13.44 39.59
Ages 80 and older 0.46 0.36 15.33 15.81 14.72
Needs help with ...
... errands out of the house 2.33 1.9 94.67 94.47 94.92
... household chores and preparing meals 2.09 1.72 86 86.96 84.77
... minor tasks of daily help 1.73 1.45 75.11 79.05 70.05
... major tasks of daily help 0.86 0.74 38.89 39.92 37.56
Care level - Zero: Person in need of help 0.77 0.61 26 24.11 28.43
Care level - One 0.8 0.63 31.11 30.43 31.98
Care level - Two 0.6 0.53 28.22 30.83 24.87
Care level - Three 0.31 0.27 14.44 14.62 14.21
Other sources of help 0.5 0.41 24 25.3 22.34
Observations 28,487 21,933 450 253 197
Source: GSOEP subsample of men of the waves 2001 to 2007 (unweighted).
aThese values are mean values for the respective samples, not percentages.
18women. In addition to caring for their children, women might mostly be caring for
their husbands because women tend to be younger when they get married and they
are often in better health than men of the same age. The higher proportion of single
men caring for somebody else might be an indicator that other sources of care are not
available. Households are larger in general if a care recipient lives within the household.
The existence of young children in a household may indicate an endogeneity problem as
staying at home rather than working in the labor market before caregiving is started
might as well determine the amount of time assistance that is provided to the care
recipient (Heitmueller, 2007). Carers experience their health status to be lower, in
particular if they are not working. While this can again indicate the existence of
an endogeneity problem, it could also result from a high physical or psychological
caregiving burden (Fast et al., 1999). Households with individuals who do not work
but care for a disabled individual have about 200 to 600 euros less per month compared
to the whole samples of women and men, respectively. Thus, caregiving seems to be a
cost burden to the household at least if the care recipient lives in the same household
as the carer.
4.2 Characteristics of care recipients
The care recipients of men who provide care and do not work are mainly between
56 and 79 years old. Women are, beyond that category, more occupied with those
in the oldest old category. A higher percentage of impaired individuals needs help
in more time consuming and heavier tasks of daily living in the subsample of non-
working women carers than in the one of working female caregivers. The same picture
evolves when we look at the distribution of care recipients among the four German
care level types. Working women care for 34.12 % of individuals who do not get any
support from the long-term care insurance yet. However, this amount decreases to
25.14 % for non-working women. These frequencies change places for care recipient’s
ranked in care levels one to three. Getting support in care provision seems to promote
female caregivers employment, though. The higher availability of other sources of help
for men compared to the women’s sample could explain the more balanced picture
19between workers and non-workers.
5 Empirical model
5.1 Dependent and independent variables
The dependent variable in the labor supply regression equation is a binary indicator
of labor force participation which equals 1 if the individual is working in the labor
market and 0 otherwise. It has to be interpreted as the latent propensity to work in
the labor market. GMM-ﬁxed-eﬀects and panel logit ﬁxed-eﬀects are used to estimate
the eﬀects on this binary measure. In addition, a linear measure of actual hours worked
is regressed on the exogenous variables with the same GMM-ﬁxed-eﬀects and a linear
panel ﬁxed-eﬀects model.
As individual characteristics, the marital status and the health status are included
into the regression equations. In addition, the household size and the number of chil-
dren are added. The latter is divided into those children which are younger than seven
years old and into those aged seven to sixteen. The logarithmized household income
does not include the labor market earnings of the respective observation but the earn-
ings of other household members as well as the overall non-labor income. In addition,
two care variables are added. These are the amount of hours somebody provides care,
and the amount of care allowance the care recipient receives.
5.2 Unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity bias, and panel
attrition
An advantage of the panel structure is that unobserved heterogeneity can be taken into
account. Topics concerning labor supply have to bear in mind that the motivation to
work or keep working might have a great inﬂuence on the probability of employment.
However, this paper has to deal with an additional unobserved eﬀect: The amount of
labor supplied will be aﬀected by a feeling of responsibility and a feeling of generalized
reciprocity of the carer to the impaired individual. This feeling becomes even more
20inﬂuential the closer the relationship is which is likely to be inﬂuenced by upbringing
and social norms. Neglecting heterogeneity, therefore, leads to omitted variable bias
and the idiosyncratic error is correlated with some of the exogenous regressors as its
values are not completely random anymore. As I am dealing with a panel data set
consisting of six data waves, it is important to conduct tests for selection bias due
to panel attrition. As caregiving can be very stressful, some individuals might refuse
to answer the SOEP questionnaires. However, tests after Verbeek and Nijman (1992)
and Wooldridge (1995) for the diﬀerent samples do not show signiﬁcant drop outs for
caregiving reasons.11
Like in the analyses of Ettner (1995, 1996); Stern (1995) (U.S.), Heitmueller (2007)
(Great Britain) and Bolin et al. (2008) (11 European countries), the endogeneity bias
has to be solved here. Individuals could be reluctant to provide a high amount of care
hours if they are employed. Other household members might decide to care for more
hours because they are not working in the labor market. Another option is to purchase
formal care in the market if the time cost of the carer is higher than the price of
care services (Ettner, 1996). This assumption is as well consistent with the theoretical
model: As the carer’s utility function also depends on the disabled person’s utility,
(s)he weights caregiving against other time consuming activities. In addition, labor
supply can be reduced if caregiving is started or its burden becomes higher. Therefore,
causality could lead in both directions. The variable which indicates if a disabled
individual is present in the household is not expected to be endogenous as the presence
in the household cannot be chosen by other household members. Because caregiving
and labor supply are supposed to be negatively correlated, neglecting the endogeneity
problem might lead to overstating the impact of care on labor supply (Ettner, 1996).
I use eﬃcient GMM estimation with ﬁxed eﬀects for instrumenting the endogenous
regressor in both labor supply speciﬁcations. Good instruments should be correlated
with the endogenous number of care hours and should be uncorrelated with the error
of the labor supply regression equation at the same time. A natural set of instruments
are the characteristics of the impaired individual which are likely to have a direct
11The results are available from the author on request.
21Table 3: Test statistics for GMM estimation
Women Men
Labor force Work hours Labor force Work hours
participation participation
Hours of care per week 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.07
(0.91) (0.46) (0.83) (0.39)
F-test on weakness of instruments 31.82 31.82 17.46 17.46
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Overidentiﬁcation test 2.42 1.44 3.49 2.23
(0.66) (0.84) (0.48) (0.69)
Test on exogeneity 2.58 0.48 0.39 0.08
(0.11) (0.49) (0.53) (0.78)
p-values in parentheses
eﬀect on the amount of hours they are cared for but only an indirect one on labor
supply. Therefore, the dummy which indicates if a care recipient lives in the household
is used as an instrument next to the four categories of ADL and IADL in which the
impaired individual needs help. Table 3 presents the most important test statistics for
instrumental variable estimation.
The potential weakness of instruments is tested by an F-test which examines the
joint explanatory power of the excluded instruments. As a rule of thumb its value
should be larger than 10 for one endogenous regressor. Otherwise, there is doubt
about the strength of the instruments although the test statistic is signiﬁcant and
the sample size is large (Staiger and Stock, 1997). This rule of thumb is fulﬁlled for
all labor supply speciﬁcations. The overidentiﬁcation test conﬁrms that the exclusion
restrictions are indeed valid so that the instruments are no signiﬁcant predictors of
labor supply. It has to be kept in mind, though, that this test is only conducted
for all but one instrument. It is still crucial to argue that labor supply does not
inﬂuence the instruments. Because all instruments represent exogenous health shocks
and, therefore, cannot be inﬂuenced by the carer, reversed causality can be ruled out
here and both requirements are fulﬁlled. As can be seen in Table 3, regardless of being
male or female, hours of care per week does not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on labor
supply for both GMM labor supply speciﬁcations, respectively. In the ﬁnal step, I will
22test for endogeneity of the endogenous regressor when using eﬃcient GMM estimation.
If the suspected endogenous regressor is in fact exogenous, GMM estimates will be
less eﬃcient than those of non-IV estimation while the latter are not inconsistent as
would be the case under an endogeneity bias (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The null
hypothesis that the variable can in fact be treated as exogenous cannot be rejected in
any of the labor supply regressions. Therefore, I present the panel logit ﬁxed-eﬀects
results for the eﬀect on the binary labor supply measure and the linear panel ﬁxed-
eﬀects results for the eﬀect on actual hours worked, without instrumental variable
estimation in addition to the GMM ﬁxed-eﬀects results in the next section.
An explanation for the infrequence of an endogeneity problem in this analysis and
the previous literature may result from the time horizon of care decisions. It could
well be the case that most individuals decide long before care is needed for a relative
how much care they are willing to provide under diﬀerent scenarios. Aﬀection in the
case of partners and children, and childhood in connection to a feeling of generalized
reciprocity to parents are likely to induce long-term decisions that are quite inelastic.
6 Results - Determinants of labor supply
Expectations on the reaction of labor supply on some exogenous variables have already
been derived in section 3.2. Table 4 and 5 present the empirical results.
The focus of this paper is to determine if care responsibilities within SOEP house-
holds have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the carer’s labor force participation. As the charac-
teristics of the care recipient are expected to have an indirect eﬀect on labor supply,
the hours an individual is occupied with caregiving is the variable of the most interest.
Regardless of using instrumental variable estimation, the eﬀect of care hours on labor
supply is not signiﬁcant for the probability of leaving the labor market for both sexes.
However, caring eight hours more per week decreases the work hours by 35 minutes
per week for women and by 44 minutes for men in the regression equations without
controlling for endogeneity. The impact on work hours is, therefore, economically small.
The amount of Social Security support through care allowance has a very small
23Table 4: Regression results on labor supply measures - women
Labor force Labor force Actual hours worked Actual hours worked
participation participation per week per week
(Panel GMM FE) (Panel logit FE) (Panel GMM FE) (Panel OLS FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours of care per week 0.000 −0.002 −0.028 −0.059∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.038) (0.022)
Household size 0.043∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 1.621∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.029) (0.215) (0.244)
Child(ren) younger than 7 −0.105∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −3.196∗∗∗ −3.193∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.041) (0.317) (0.347)
Child(ren) aged 7 to 16 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −1.288∗∗∗ −1.292∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.024) (0.189) (0.211)
Divorced and separated 0.013 0.048 0.829 0.820
(0.019) (0.048) (0.623) (0.681)
Single 0.051 0.050 3.336∗∗ 3.333∗∗
(0.039) (0.128) (1.324) (1.460)
Widow(er) −0.037 −0.087 −1.241 −1.416
(0.032) (0.119) (1.108) (1.284)
Very poor health −0.054∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −1.526∗∗ −1.536∗∗
(0.018) (0.051) (0.596) (0.605)
Poor health −0.004 −0.009 0.049 0.040
(0.012) (0.034) (0.385) (0.390)
Fair health 0.011 0.035 0.323 0.314
(0.010) (0.035) (0.329) (0.325)
Good health 0.008 0.026 0.285 0.281
(0.009) (0.031) (0.297) (0.292)
Monthly net household −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
income in euro (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Care allowance 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 20.478∗∗∗
(0.716)
Observations 29,050 7,859 29,050 30,290
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Own calculations. SOEP, waves 2001 - 2007.
24Table 5: Regression results on labor supply measures - men
Labor force Labor force Actual hours worked Actual hours worked
participation participation per week per week
(Panel GMM FE) (Panel logit FE) (Panel GMM FE) (Panel OLS FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours of care per week −0.000 −0.003 −0.070 −0.074∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.081) (0.025)
Household size 0.083∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 3.642∗∗∗ 3.647∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.050) (0.253) (0.278)
Child(ren) younger than 7 −0.035∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −1.663∗∗∗ −1.667∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.037) (0.303) (0.313)
Child(ren) aged 7 to 16 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −1.226∗∗∗ −1.230∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.025) (0.222) (0.236)
Divorced and separated 0.018 0.083 0.235 0.232
(0.014) (0.051) (0.662) (0.732)
Single 0.067∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 2.093∗∗ 2.091∗
(0.022) (0.064) (1.047) (1.108)
Widow(er) −0.023 0.070 −0.851 −0.854
(0.049) (0.116) (1.876) (2.305)
Very poor health −0.096∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −3.696∗∗∗ −3.704∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.068) (0.750) (0.768)
Poor health −0.050∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −1.670∗∗∗ −1.676∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.051) (0.476) (0.494)
Fair health −0.013 −0.044 −0.247 −0.249
(0.008) (0.028) (0.394) (0.400)
Good health −0.010 −0.027 −0.238 −0.240
(0.007) (0.026) (0.355) (0.357)
Monthly net household −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
income in euro (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Care allowance 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 32.817∗∗∗
(0.776)
Observations 27,314 5,773 27,314 28,487
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Own calculations. SOEP, waves 2001 - 2007.
25but signiﬁcantly positive inﬂuence on the decision of labor supply for men. That this
eﬀect is not economically important is also obvious if one looks at the overview of care
insurance services (Federal Ministry of Health (ed.), 2008). The care allowance that a
care recipient receives over diﬀerent care levels only ranges from 215 euros to 675 euros
per month. As many authors have emphasized in their research, forgone employment
opportunities and earnings, less social contact, and emotional and physical well-being
costs make care very expensive to the carer (Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 2003a,b;
Fast et al., 1999). The amount of ﬁnancial resources like care allowance, payments for
help to the carer, and the prospect of a possible bequest might be too low to compensate
these costs and, therefore, economically strong reactions cannot be expected.
The household size has a positive eﬀect on women’s labor supply and an even larger
one for men. Children younger than seven have a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the
labor force participation of women (more than 3 hours per week) and men (more than
1 hour per week). For women, also children aged between seven and sixteen years
have a negative eﬀect on work hours and employment probability although it is lower
than the one for younger children. In the case of women, only the actual working
time is aﬀected by being single (more than 3 hours per week). However, being single
increases the probability of employment (14.3 percentage points) and the hours of work
for men (2 hours per week). Other marital status variables are not signiﬁcant. Only
a very bad health status has a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence on the labor supply of
women. Similarly for men, being in poor health decreases the probability of being
in paid employment compared to a man in very good health. If the income of other
individuals in the household rises or if the household’s transfer income rises, the eﬀect
on labor supply is negative as expected from comparative static results.
Overall, the eﬀects on the binary labor supply measure are mitigated by using
GMM estimation techniques. The regression results for actual work hours only diﬀer
with respect to the hours of care variable.
267 Conclusion
Most of the theoretical expectations that I derived in Section 3 could not be conﬁrmed
in the empirical results. One reason for this might stem from the small within-variances
in the sample. I only found care eﬀects which are economically small. The amount of
care hours had a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect, reducing the hours of work of men by 44
minutes if eight hours of care are additionally provided per week. The negative eﬀect
for women was by a little bit smaller, namely 35 minutes per week. The care allowance
that a disabled individual in a household might receive has an economically negligible
inﬂuence on the labor supply of the carer.
Like other international studies on this topic, the results with the latest waves of the
SOEP are economically small. However, I found signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects of care on
actual work hours without using GMM estimation, which was possible as exogeneity
of the endogenous regressor care hours could not be rejected. The test on exogeneity
is also insigniﬁcant in the article of Bolin et al. (2008) who use a European data set for
individuals aged 50 and over. However, they only ﬁnd signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects for
the binary choice of labor supply for men and women. As far as actual work hours are
concerned, they do not estimate a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of care hours. My study also
diﬀers compared to the results of Ettner (1995), Ettner (1996) and Stern (1995), who
only estimate signiﬁcant negative eﬀects after controlling for endogeneity. However,
the expectation of Schneider et al. (2001) that the introduction of the mandatory
public care insurance will lower the (non-economic) costs of caregiving seems to be
conﬁrmed when our results for women are compared to each other. Unfortunately, my
results cannot explain which services have contributed to this cost reduction due to
data limitations. Nevertheless, it seems quite likely that the ﬁrst pathway described
by Schneider et al. (2001) is true when looking at the caregiving workforce in general:
As I cannot ﬁnd economically signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of care hours on labor supply,
time spend on leisure might be reduced before work hours are.
My results, therefore, illustrate that the compatibility of care and employment
is less of a problem, at least when the demand for care is still low. However, the
27probability to work is decreasing when caregiving tasks become heavier and more time
consuming. In addition, representative surveys like the ones of Schneekloth and Engels
(2006) and questions in the SOEP have shown that most people want to stay at home
if care becomes necessary and that this also implies that most carers try to fulﬁll this
wish as long as possible. The services of the public care insurance should, therefore,
react to this reality and enforce those services that support the ﬂexible time schedule
of informal carers at least for those individuals who care for a relatively high number
of hours per week. Unfortunately, I am not able to test for care hour thresholds with
SOEP data as the number of aﬀected observations becomes even smaller. Oﬀers like
day care or substitutional care when the carer is on holiday have to be extended and
supplemented to include the job of a carer as a reason for using those services as well.
The ﬂexibility of part-time care institutions is very important in this respect. This
should be complemented with more ﬂexible work arrangements for those employees who
have to look after a disabled individual. The amendment of the care insurance regime
between 1999 and 2008 by the German Pﬂege-Weiterentwicklungsgesetz which came
into force on the 1st of July 2008, introduces a “care time” for employees. After this bill,
they can get up to six months of unpaid leave with a guarantee on a similar position in
their ﬁrm. A reduction in working hours is also an option here. It is also possible to take
up to ten days oﬀ in emergencies. The Pﬂege-Weiterentwicklungsgesetz systematically
includes impaired individuals that do not suﬀer from physical but psychic illnesses
of dementia now as well. The reform of the monetary aspects of the care insurance
includes higher rates in the German care allowance as well as an increase in mandatory
care insurance contributions by 0.25 percentage points to 1.95 % of employees’ monthly
gross earnings. The provision of information to carers, a reform of formal care services,
and better case management is also implemented into the new law to support carer
and care recipient (Federal Law Gazette (ed.) 2008).
To build an understanding of the needs of the care recipient which go beyond the
medical ones and to support the carer in organizing work and care commitments, fur-
ther research is necessary in Germany. First of all, appropriate databases have to be
sampled to ensure that a suﬃcient number of families, which have a care recipient
28among themselves, are observed. Descriptive statistics on the usage of care services
already exist through the representative studies of Infratest Sozialforschung. Neverthe-
less, little is known about the concrete organization of day to day care in an informal
setting and about the interaction of social or family networks. It is also important to
look at subgroups in the population to understand diﬀerences in using care insurance
services by income. The combination of work and care is likely to be even more diﬃcult
for those individuals and their families which only have a low income to their disposal.
The media has recently emphasized social aspects of care. The dignity of care
recipients in formal and institutional care is the focus of this discussion. The economic
burden to the carer in particular, is not perceived as a major problem yet. However,
the ﬁnancing of the pay-as-you-go system in the care insurance can only be secured if
the public realizes that the carer has to be provided with ﬂexible but reliable sources
of help for combining care and work commitments.
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34Appendix
Formula Appendix for Section 3.2 - Comparative static results -
The derivatives of the utility maximization problem in section 3.2 as well as the deriva-
tive of the comparative static results are calculated in this section. The analysis follows
the example of Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) and is also used by Sloan et al. (1997).
For mathematical details see Chiang and Wainwright (2005). The utility function is
U = u(cc)+v(T − hw − hc)+x(y,hc,h 0,g,c c,c r) (1)
which is maximized by the carer under the two equations
c ≤ whw + A (2)
T ≥ hw + hc (3)
An additional assumption is that
hw,h c > 0 (4)
as the eﬀect of exogenous variables on labour supply and informal caregiving is to be
considered here. A prerequisite is, of course, that both events exist. As the budget
constraint is binding due to the utilization of all available resources while the time
constraint is not because I assume that the carer enjoys at least some leisure, derivations
have to be done by Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Z = u(cc)+v(T −hw−hc)+x(y,hc,h 0,g,c c,c r)+λ1(c−whw−A)+λ2(T −hw−hc) (5)
Zc = u  + x  + λ1 ≤ 0 c ≥ 0 cZc =0
Zhw = −v  − wλ1 − λ2 ≤ 0 hw ≥ 0 hwZhw =0
Zhc = −v  + x  − λ2 ≤ 0 hc ≥ 0 hcZhc =0
Zλ1 = c − whw − A ≥ 0 λ1 ≥ 0 λ1Zλ1 =0
Zλ2 = T − hw − hc ≥ 0 λ2 ≥ 0 λ2Zλ2 =0
(6)
35are the Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order conditions. According to these equations, the marginal
utility of work is equal to the marginal utility of leisure which is then again equal to
the marginal utility of care. As c,hw,h c are larger than zero and
λ1  =0 ,λ 2 = 0 (7)
due to the two constraints, the resulting implicit functions are
F
1 : Zλ1 = c − whw − A =0
F
2 : Zc = u
  + x
  + λ1 =0
F
3 : Zhw = −v
  − wλ1 =0
F
4 : Zhc = −v
  + x
  =0
(8)
Zλ2 is not relevant for the comparative static analysis. First of all it has to be conﬁrmed
that the bordered Hessian is less than zero. After deriving the implicit functions with
respect to the variables which are chosen by the carer I get
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(9)
which is indeed less than zero for reasonable values of the variables. Next, the ﬁrst-
order equation system is reduced to three equations by eliminating λ1. From equation
F 2 it follows that
λ1 = −u
  − x
  (10)
The system then reduces to
c − whw − a =0
−v
  + wu
  + wx5 =0
−v
  + x2 =0
(11)
To receive the eﬀect of a change in an exogenous variable on labour supply and care-
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37Table 6: Means and standard deviations, pooled sample
Women Men
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Labour force participation 0.62 0.48 0.77 0.42
Actual working hours 19.34 17.98 33.31 19.68
Care recipient in household 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.16
Care hours 0.79 7.51 0.34 4.19
Age 48.58 8.40 48.70 8.46
Household size 2.89 1.25 2.94 1.30
Number of children
Younger than 7 0.10 0.35 0.14 0.41
A g e s7t o1 6 0.47 0.79 0.48 0.81
Household income in euro 2,146.52 1,465.93 1,326.31 1,060.53
Health status
Very good 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Good 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49
Fair 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48
Poor 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34
Very poor 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Years in education 11.78 2.46 12.12 2.65
Marital status
Married 0.74 0.44 0.76 0.43
Single 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33
Divorced 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30
Widowed 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.11
Number of observations 30,290 28,487
Characteristics of care recipient
Other care available 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Sex 97.96 14.09 97.97 14.06
Age 1.05 8.27 1.03 8.18
Married 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Care level and help needed with
...getting around outside the house 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
...household chores, preparing meals 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
...washing dressing etc. 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13
...getting into and out of bed etc. 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09
Care level 0 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09
Care level I 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09
Care level II 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Care level III 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
Care allowance 6.16 64.22 6.22 58.93
Number of observations 779 707
Own calculations. SOEP, waves 2001 - 2007.
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